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Abstract
The vulnerability of false data injection attacks on
real-time electricity pricing for the power grid market
has been recently explored. Previous work has focused
on the impact caused by attackers that compromise
pricing signals and send false prices to a subset of
consumers. In this paper we extend previous work by
considering a more powerful and general adversary
model, a new analysis method based on sensitivity
functions, and by proposing several countermeasures
that can mitigate the negative impact of these attacks.
Countermeasures include adding a low-pass filter to
the pricing signals, selecting the time interval between
price updates, selecting parameters of the controller,
designing robust control algorithms, and by detecting
anomalies in the behavior of the system.
1. Introduction
The objective of the power grid is to generate
and then deliver enough electric power to match the
demand of consumers. Unlike other critical infrastruc-
tures like water or gas distribution networks that can
accommodate a variation in demand by storing their
resource, the power grid cannot store electricity, and
thus, electricity must be generated in the exact moment
that it is consumed. If the supply of power is greater
than the demand, this excess power is stored in the
form of kinetic energy in the electricity generators,
which produces an acceleration of the generator result-
ing in higher rotation frequency; on the other hand,
if the supply of power is not enough to match the
demand, generators will have to provide more current
to the system, and the magnetic field associated with
this increased current will slow down the generator–
resulting in lower rotation frequency. All the equip-
ment in the power grid is meant to operate at a specific
frequency (e.g., 60Hz) and changes in the frequency
of electricity will result in poor power quality and
ultimately risk of physical equipment damage and if
the frequency deviation is large enough it may trip
circuit breakers and disconnect regions of the grid
causing blackouts.
To maintain a balance between optimizing the use
of resources and the real-time control requirements for
keeping the frequency and voltage of the power grid
at their design levels, the power grid uses a daily and
hourly scheduling of generation units to match the
forecast electricity load via wholesale market trans-
actions. A scheduling coordinator solicits generation
through some form of auction where lowest bidders
generate electricity and this in turn creates an eco-
nomically optimal schedule of generators. In contrast
to these traditional wholesale markets (e.g., between
generation utilities and distribution utilities), many
retail markets (e.g., between a distribution utility and
an industry consumer of electricity) have traditionally
adopted static pricing schemes such as fixed and time-
of-use tariffs, under which consumers have limited
incentives to adapt their electricity consumption to
market conditions. This lack of incentives results in
high peak demands that strain infrastructure capacities
and unnecessarily increase operational costs [1]. This
approach is inefficient, since the system infrastructure
used to guarantee supply under peak hours is not
completely used most of the time. According to the
The US Department of Energy, 10% of the whole
generating capacity and 25% of distribution capacity
is used less than the 5% of the time.
In an effort to increase the efficiency of the
power grid, many retail-markets are expanding the use
of demand-response programs. In their basic form,
demand-response programs are a control problem
where the control signal are the incentives (e.g., real-
time pricing), or direct-load control (e.g., the utility
directly controlling the set-points of air conditioning
systems in specific cases) for consumers to reduce elec-
tricity consumption during peak hours and to shift this
load to off-peak hours (Figure 1). Currently most of the
electricity consumers leveraging demand-response pro-
grams are large commercial consumers, but the market
is expanding more and more to smaller industries and
even residential consumers. As the number of smart
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devices necessary to manage this market expands, the
potential attack surface of the market also increases,
and therefore we need to begin considering the poten-
tial impact of attackers that compromise devices and
communication channels used in this market.
Figure 1. Real-time pricing algorithms try to con-
trol the load with price signals.
The security of demand response algorithms with
real-time electricity pricing was recently explored by
Tan et al. [1]. In their work, they consider an attacker
that has compromised a portion of the communication
channels used to send price information to consumers,
and then study the effects to the power system from
scaling and delay attacks, where the prices advertised
to smart meters are compromised by a scaling factor
(so consumers use the wrong prices) and by corrupted
timing information (so consumers use old prices).
While this previous work is an important step for
initiating the discussion on how to analyze the impact
of attacks on real-time pricing, this research has limi-
tations on the way it modeled the adversary by limiting
attacks to scaling and delays. In addition this previous
work did not discuss any security countermeasures
against attacks.
In this paper we extend the work of Tan et al. [1]
in several directions:
• Parametric adversary models (e.g., scaling or de-
lay attacks) are a common assumption to keep a
mathematical analysis of the problem tractable,
but constraining the adversary this way is a defi-
ciency in modeling realistic attackers which will
not be subject to these constraints. We model a
more realistic attacker that can inject an arbitrary
modification to the price received by the con-
sumer, and is not constrained to scaling or delay
attacks.
• Real-time pricing forms a closed-loop control
system, and small modifications to the signals
in the closed loop made by the adversary can
be iteratively amplified by the feedback. We use
sensitivity analysis to identify the attack signals
that will be amplified and the ones that will be
attenuated by the control loop, and thus, we find
the worst-possible attacks for any given bound on
the maximum price deviation introduced by an
attacker at any time instant.
• In addition to modeling and analyzing the impact
of attacks that compromise the price signals, we
also model the effect of attacks that compromise
sensor signals (smart meter electricity consump-
tion reports).
• We propose countermeasures based on changing
the parameter of the original controller by Tan
et al. In addition, we propose an estimator and
a new robust-control design that estimates the
perturbation and computes a new price to attenu-
ate the error between supply and demand caused
by the attacker. We also introduce a low-pass
filter as a solution to attenuate any high-frequency
component of an attack, thus guaranteeing that
our robust controller will minimize the difference
between power generated and power consumed
with, or without attack.
• Finally, while the robust controller will minimize
the impact of any attack, it will still be beneficial
to notify the operator of the power grid of any
potential indicator of an attack. Thus we pro-
pose an attack-detection algorithm and evaluate
its effectiveness in a preliminary experiment to
identify the properties of the detector for dif-
ferent controller parameters, and different attack
frequencies.
2. Related Work: Impact of Integrity At-
tacks in the Power Grid
Our work falls within the scope of integrity at-
tacks (or false-data injection attacks) to the sensor or
control signals of a cyber-physical system. Integrity
attacks have been proposed as a way to analyze the
vulnerability of cyber-physical systems in general and
the power grid in particular. Injecting false data to
state estimation algorithms used in bulk of the power
grid was first proposed by Liu et al. [2], and similar
integrity attacks were proposed for compromised smart
meters trying to defraud the electric utility [3].
The work on integrity attacks against bad data
detectors for state estimation in the power grid has
generated a significant body of follow up work; for
example Da´n and Sandberg [4], consider a defender
that can secure individual sensor measurements by,
for example, replacing an existing meter with another
meter with better security mechanisms such as tamper
resistance or hardware security support. Kosut et al. [5]
also extend the basic false data injection attack to con-
sider attackers trying to maximize the error introduced
in the estimate, and defenders with a new detection
algorithm that attempts to detect false data injection
attacks. Similar false-data injection attacks have been
considered for specific devices in the power grid,
such as integrity attacks against the Flexible Alternate
Current Transmission System (FACTS) [6], [7], and
Automatic Generator Control (AGC) [8]–[10]. All this
related work has targeted operational data of the power
grid, and is not related to electricity markets.
Negrete-Pincetic et al. [11] were one of the first to
study how false control signals can affect the social
welfare of the electricity market. Related work by Xie
et al. [12] studied how false data injection attacks can
be used to defraud bulk electricity markets by modify-
ing Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs), and work by
Jia et al. [13] studied how false meter data in the bulk
of the power grid can be used to cause the largest errors
in LMP estimation. These integrity attacks have been
studied in the bulk electricity market and specifically,
the estimation problem alone; most previous work does
not consider how the control algorithm can be designed
to minimize the impact of integrity attacks, or studied
the feedback control loop behavior of the system under
attack.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Demand Response Model
We follow the real-time pricing model from Tan et
al. [1]. This model considers a market with consumers
of electricity, suppliers of electricity, and a third party
entity—an Independent System Operator (ISO)—with
the goal of matching supply and demand by setting the
market price for electricity. The general assumption is
that the ISO determines a clearing price λk valid for
the period of time [k · T, (k + 1) · T ] (this is called
an ex-ante market) every T hours (e.g., T=0.5h) and
announces it to the suppliers and consumers.
The electricity demand is characterized by two com-
ponents: a baseline electricity consumption bk that cap-
tures the electricity consumption that is independent of
the pricing mechanism, and a price-responsive demand
w(λk), which captures the amount of electricity con-
sumption that can be controlled by the pricing signal
λk.
The aggregated demand of all consumers is thus:
dk(λk) = bk + w(λk).
For simulation purposes bk can be obtained from
historical demand curves such as those from the New
York ISO [14].
The Constant Elasticity of Own-price (CEO) has
been commonly adopted to characterize the total price-
responsive demand. The CEO model is defined by
w(λk) = D(λk)
 (1)
where D > 0 and  ∈ (−1, 0) are constants. The price
elasticity of demand is captured by .
Similarly, for the supply of electricity, Tan et al.,
propose a linear regression between supply and cost,
a model they validated from the Australian Energy
Market Operator and the the electricity market in Cali-
fornia. Under these assumption the supply of electricity
can be modeled by the following equation:
s(λk) = pλk + q, (2)
where p and q are parameters estimated by the histor-
ical market data from the area of study.
3.2. Control Objective
The control objective of the ISO is to send price
signals λk to keep the error between supply and
demand of electric power
ek = s(λk)− d(k, λk)
close to zero for every time instant k. This can be
seen as a control problem in which the system to
be controlled is the outcome of a market, the control
variable is the price signal λk and the variable that can
be measured is the error ek.
The price signal λk must be carefully designed
because a direct feedback of the wholesale prices to
the users might cause oscillations or even instability
[1], [15].
3.3. Transfer Function Representation
Transfer functions are a mathematical representation
of linear difference (or differential) equations that al-
low us to represent the system in a compact way and to
evaluate the performance of the system in therms of the
frequency components of the control signals—recall
that every time series has an equivalent representation
(a one to one mapping) to a function in the frequency
domain given by the Fourier transform.
For our discrete-time system (where sensor and con-
trol actions are taken at given time steps k separated by
the sampling period T (e.g., 30 minutes), the transfer
function for the equations modeling the dynamics of
the system can be obtained by using the z-transform
(a transform similar to the Fourier transform).
In particular, we can define the transfer function of
the price stabilization algorithm, the system, and the
observation mechanism as Gc(z), Gp(z), and H(z),
respectively.
To express these transfer functions it is necessary
to approximate the dynamics system at the opera-
tion point λ0 to a linear system. Hence, following
Tan et al. [1] we make the following approximations
with the Taylor polynomials of the supply s() and
demand w():
s(λ) ' s˙(λ0)(λ− λ0) + s(λ0)
= s˙(λ0)λ+ s0
w(λ) ' w˙(λ0)(λ− λ0) + w(λ0)
= w˙(λ0)λ+ w0
where f˙ = dfdλ , and where we define the constant (or
endogenous) terms with s0 = s(λ0) − λ0s˙(λ0) and
w0 = w(λ0)− λ0w˙(λ0).
Therefore, the transfer functions can be defined as
Gs(z) = s˙(λ0) = p,
with initial condition s0 and
Gw(z) = w˙(λ0) = D(λ0)
−1,
with initial condition w0.
The outcome of the market can be expressed as
Gp(z) = Gs(z)−Gp(z).
3.4. Control Algorithm for Setting Prices
The price setting control algorithm depends on the
previous price λk−1 and the observed error at the
current time step ek. If ek is negative, it means that
there was more power demanded than supplied, and
thus the price will increase (to motivate consumers to
decrease consumption), while if ek is positive, then the
price will decrease. The precise amount of increase
and decrease of the prices at each time step should
be selected carefully as inadequate price updates can
make the system unstable. Tan et al. found that when
we design a proportional gain η ∈ (0, 1) in the
following price-setting algorithm:
λk = λk−1 − 2η
s˙(λ0)− w˙(λ0)ek,
The system will remain stable. η is in fact an important
design parameter for the control algorithm, and as we
will show, it can also determine the impact to the
resiliency of the system under attacks. When properly
selected, it can also attenuate the impact of attacks.
Assuming an observation device characterized by
a one-step delay transfer function: H(z) = z−1,
this price control mechanism can be represented by
a transfer function as
Gc(z) =
2η
s˙(λ0)− w˙(λ0)
1
1− z−1 .
4. Attacker Model
In contrast to one-shot attacks, where the attacker
provides false information only once [2], [16], in
this work we consider that an attacker compromises
a device or a communication channel, and has the
capability to add false information at any moment
and—more importantly—repeatedly over a long period
of time.
For example, most of the work on false data in-
jection in state estimation finds a value d to insert at
an arbitrary point in time [2], however, this previous
work does not consider the evolution of the system
dynamics over time. In this context, the question we
would like to pose from an adversarial point of view
is the following:
• What is the worst attack time series dk that can
affect the system while keeping some bounds
(prices will be bound by some maximum and
minimum values: ∀k dk ∈ [dmin, dmax].
Tan et al. [1] proposed an adversary model where
one attacker compromised the pricing communication
channel between the ISO and a percentage ρ of con-
sumers. They considered delay attacks and scaling
attacks.
In a delay attack, the compromised price is an old
version of the price, i.e., λˆk = λk−τ , and in a scaling
attack, the compromised price is a scaled version of
the true price, i.e., λˆk = γλk.
While the attacks defined above can be easily ana-
lyzed from a theoretical point of view, it is not clear
why an attacker who has compromised a commu-
nications channel will select to launch these attacks
when she has the flexibility of sending any arbitrary
time series λˆk she wants, even one that bears no
resemblance to the original time series λk.
Furthermore, scaling attacks and delay attacks are
not strategic, and do not seek to maximize any ob-
jective function from the adversary. In this work we
follow the generic and more powerful adversary model
introduced by the false data injection paper [2], and
we expand it to consider a time series. In particular,
we model a compromised communication channel as
λˆk = λk+d
a
K , where ˆlambdak is the price information
received by the victim, and dak is an arbitrary time
signal that can take any value. It is clear now that
scaling attacks and delay attacks are simple subsets
of this new attack because for every scaling or delay
attack possible producing a false price information
λˆk, there exists an arbitrary time signal dak that will
produce the same price λˆk received by the victim.
The question we now face is how to determine a
strategic attack time series dak that will try to cause
as much damage as possible (i.e., that will try to
maximize the mismatch between power generated and
power consumed). One of our key insights into tackling
this problem is the fact that for every time series,
there is a one-to-one correspondence of the time series
and its frequency (Fourier transform) representation.
Therefore, instead of attempting to analyze the worst
time series dak in time, we identify the worst-possible
attacks in frequency space.
In order to provide a mathematical tool that enables
us to quantify the impact of the attack, we use sensi-
tivity analysis. Sensitivity functions have been widely
used to analyze the impact of external disturbances
or parameter changes on the output of a feedback
system. In systems and control theory, it is well known
that feedback can attenuate or amplify disturbances;
therefore, using the frequency representation of the
system (the transfer function), it is possible to obtain
the sensitivity function and observe the response of
the system to a perturbation of a specific frequency
ω. [17].
In this work we focus our attention on two types of
additive attacks: i) additive attack in the price informa-
tion, and ii) additive attack in the sensor information.
Each type of attack produces different consequences
to the system.
In the next section we give the formal incorporation
of the attacks against pricing signal, and in the section
after that we use sensitivity analysis to identify the
impact of the attacks.
4.1. Incorporating the Attack into the Real-
Time Pricing Model
We assume that an amount ρ of communication
channels are compromised, and each of these con-
sumers receives the price value λˆk = λk + dak, where
da ∈ R corresponds to the additional false information.
It is necessary to identify how the inclusion of this
attack affects the system representation of the real-
time problem. In particular, we need to identify how
the attack changes the transfer functions of the model
(i.e., we need to characterize the new transfer functions
G1w(z) for the consumers who are unaffected, and
G2w(z) for the consumers who receive false informa-
tion, as shown in Figure 2.)
Let us consider the price response demand based
on the CEO model for the set of compromised nodes
ρwk(λk, d
a
k) = ρD(λk + d
a
k)
. In order to linearize
this model it is necessary to assume that |dk| << λk
and λk > 0. As we will discuss towards the end
of the paper (the attack-detection formulation), this
is a perfect assumption for an attacker that wants to
minimize its chances of being detected (by causing
small changes to the price |dk| << λk) but at the same
time wants to find the best way to find a small signal
deviation that will maximize the potential damage to
the system.
The linearized model is described by:
w(λˆk) = ρw(λo + d
a
o) +
ρw˙(λo + d
a
o) (λk + d
a
k − λo − dao) +
(1− ρ)(w(λo) + w˙(λo)(λk − λo))
We can group the price-independent terms with
bk (the baseline consumption of electricity that is
independent of the price), and then also group the
price-dependent components for the transfer functions.
G1w(z) = (1− ρ)w˙(λo), (3)
then corresponds to the transfer function of consumers
who receive unmodified price information, and
G2w(z) = ρw˙(λo + do), (4)
corresponds to the transfer function of the victims.
Under the assumption that |dk| << λk, we can neglect
the term do in the linearization, such that
G2w(z) = ρw˙(λo). (5)
5. Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity function models how one input to the
system (in our case the attack) affects another signal
in the system (we are mostly interested to see how the
attack affects the error in power generated minus the
demand, and to also see the impact on the prices).
We start by looking at the impact that a distur-
bance da(z) (in the frequency space) can have on the
error E(z). In particular, the sensitivity function for
Gc(z)
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Figure 2. Block diagram of the real-time pricing model under attack.
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these two time series (denoted as SE,d) is the ratio
E(z)/da(z):
SE,d = − G
2
w(z)
1 +Gc(z)H(z)Gp(z)
= −ρw˙(λ0)(z − 1)
(z − 1 + 2η) . (6)
As stated before, our interest is to analyze the effects
of an additive attack in the frequency domain. We
denote the angular frequency as ω. We then replace
z = ejωT for T being the sampling period (the time
interval between updating the sensor measurements
and the prices). It is important to notice that the maxi-
mum frequency that an attacker can generate is limited
by the sampling period, such that ωmax = pi/T . For
instance, if the sampling period is T = 0.5 hours, then
ωmax = 2pi.
In order to observe the effects an attack time-series
with different frequency components in the output error
E(z), we obtain the expression |SE,d(ejω)| for ω, the
disturbance frequency:
|SE,d(ejω)| =
|ρw˙(λ0)|
(
sin4(ω/2)− 2η sin4(ω/2) + η2 sin2(ω/2))1/2(
sin2(ω/2)− 2η sin2(ω/2) + η2)
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Figure 4. A smaller control parameter η will be
able to attenuate the impact of high-frequency
attacks; however this will come at the cost of longer
convergence times.
From this equation we can see that the percentage
of compromised channels ρ has a scaling effect on
the sensitivity of the system. Moreover, the selection
of the control parameter η proposed by Tan et al. is
fundamental for attenuating the effects of the attack.
The left side of Figure 3 shows how the attack can be
amplified (or attenuated) as a function of the frequency
of the attack signal. Clearly, the impact the supply-
demand mismatch E is severe for most frequencies;
however, we can also see how the control parameter
η can be selected to attenuate the impact of high-
frequency signals: smaller values of η will minimize
the impact of high-frequency components of the attack
time-series—this comes at the cost of a slower control
action (as seen in Figure 4) which might not be a bad
idea, as changes in prices will remain small, giving
consumers more predictability in their electricity con-
sumption habits.
Recall that if the output E is different from zero, then
there is over demand or over production of electricity,
which can affect considerably the system (resulting in
large frequency changes). Even if the price variations
are small, the output amplifies the disturbance. There
is a trade off between the η, ρ, and the frequency of
the disturbance. An attacker can easily take advantage
of this fact, and introduce intelligently false data to a
portion of the users. This information can be of small
amplitude, and hardly detected; however, the effects on
the output can be catastrophic.
We can also obtain the sensitivity function with
respect to the price. This function reveals how the
attack modifies the real price calculated by the ISO.
The function is described by
Sλ,d(z) = − Gc(z)G
2
w(z)H(z)
1 +Gc(z)H(z)Gp(z)
= − 2ηρw˙(λ0)
(s˙(λ0)− w˙(λ0))(z − 1 + 2η) , (7)
and looking at the magnitude of the frequency compo-
nents we obtain:
|Sλ,d(ejω)| =
|ηρw˙(λ0)|
(s˙(λ0)− w˙(λ0))
(
sin2(ω/2)− 2η sin2(ω/2) + n2)1/2 .
The left side of Figure 3 shows the sensitivity function
with respect to the price for different values of η, and
ρ = 0.5. With this selection of ρ, the real price changes
produced by the attack are attenuated for all η.
5.1. Applying Lessons Learned in the Fre-
quency Domain to the Time Domain
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Figure 5. Modification in the price for the scaling
attack with a scale parameter γ = 0.95, delay
attack with a delay τ = 8, and the additive attack
dak = sin(2pikT )
Now that we have gained some insight into how the
“frequency components” of a time series can affect the
system, we look again at the “time domain” to apply
these lessons in the analysis of attacks.
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First we take a look at how the attacks proposed
in previous work (scaling and delay attacks) compare
to attacks with a frequency designed to maximize
the error between generated and consumed power.
Figure 5 shows a typical example of a the effects of a
scaling attack, a delay attack, and the attack targeting
the frequency where the maximization of the error
is maximum. The left hand side of the figure shows
three different attack time series: the green signal is
the scaling attack, the blue signal is the delay attack,
and the black signal is the new attack designed with
our sensitivity function analysis. The right hand side
of Figure 5 shows how previously proposed attacks
generate a much smaller error than the attack designed
with the help of the sensitivity function.
We now look at attacks of different frequencies and
their effect on both: (1) the error in generated and
consumed power, and (2) the price signal.
Figure 6 shows a high-frequency attack (black) and
a low-frequency attack (red) on the left. The control
algorithm is using η = 0.8 and therefore we can
see a large error magnification caused by this control
parameter (as predicted by Figure 3). Similarly, the
price signal is also amplified for the high frequency
attack (as can be seen by the figure on the right).
Figure 7 shows a high-frequency attack (black) and
a low-frequency attack (red) on the left. The control
algorithm is using in this case the parameter η = 0.1,
and it can be seen (in the middle figure) how the impact
of the error between supply and demand is attenuated
when compared to Figure 6. The other interesting thing
to observe on the figure at the right is that (as predicted
by Figure 3) the price signal is attenuated for high
frequencies when we use small η.
6. Modeling Attacks on Sensors
Previous work has only considered integrity attacks
to the price signals, but the sensors (or smart meters)
can also be compromised and can be used to send false
electricity consumption reports to the controller. This
new attack model requires a new mathematical analysis
of the attacks.
Now we assume that the attack occurs in the infor-
mation that each consumer sends to the ISO, where
N sensors are compromised (Figure 8). We can ob-
serve that the main difference between attacking price
signals (i.e., control commands) and sensor signals, is
the fact that sensor signals are going to be aggregated
in this case, and therefore we do not need to model
two different transfer functions for compromised con-
sumers, and uncompromised consumers (as we had to
do when the price signal was attacked).
We define nak as the attack over one sensor, and
study the sensitivity for one attack, and due to the
linearity of the model and the assumption of homo-
geneous attacks, we scale the analysis by a factor
N ∈ Z+, which is the number of compromised
sensors.
Gc(z)
Gs(z)
Gw(z)
H(z)
+
-
So − wo − bk
-
+
+
+
E(z)
Λ(z)
na(z)
+
-
Figure 8. Block diagram of the real-time pricing
model with an attack na on the sensor values.
The sensitivity function that relates the output E(z)
with respect to the sensor additive attack na is given
by
SE,n = − N
1 +Gp(z)H(z)Gc(z)
= −N z − 1
z − 1 + 2η . (8)
Evaluating z = ejω, we obtain the frequency response
of the sensitivity function as
|SE,d(ejω)| =
N
(
sin4(ω/2)− 2η sin4(ω/2) + η2 sin2(ω/2))1/2(
sin2(ω/2)− 2η sin2(ω/2) + η2)
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Figure 9. Sensitivity with respect to the supply-
demand error (left) and price (right) for only one
compromised sensor.
Similarly, we evaluate the effects of the price vari-
ations provoked by the false sensor information:
Sλ,n(z) = −N Gc(z)H(z)
1 +Gp(z)H(z)Gc(z)
= N
2η
(s˙(λ0)− w˙(λ0))(z − 1 + 2η) (9)
|Sλ,n(ejω)| =
N |η|
(s˙(λ0)− w˙(λ0))
(
sin2(ω/2)− 2η sin2(ω/2) + n2)1/2 .
(10)
Figure 9 shows the graphical representation of both
sensitivity functions. Clearly, the sensitivity functions
with respect to the sensor attack are scaled versions
of the sensitivity with additive attack in the price.
Therefore, if the additive attack in the price occurs
with ρ = 1, for a total number of consumers NT >>
|(˙λo)|, the effects of the same attack in all the sensors
(N = NT ) will produce a larger impact.
In order to illustrate the different impacts for both
types of attacks (control signals vs. sensor signals) we
assume a total number of consumers NT = 1000000.
We analyze two different cases: i) an attack in the
price information with dak = 0.25 sin(pik/2)$/MW ,
ii) an attack on the sensor measurements with nak =
0.2 sin(pik/2)kW/h.
Figure 10 shows the maximum value of the output E
when a disturbance of the form dk = 0.25 sin(pik/2)
is introduced to the price value and to the sensors,
for different values of η, and for different amount of
compromised consumers (for both types of attacks).
We can see that for the same number of communication
channels compromised, the attacks can be actually
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Figure 10. Comparison between the additive at-
tack over the price information and over the sen-
sors.
much worse if the attacker decides to compromised
sensors vs. compromising the control signals.
7. Designing an Attack-Resilient Con-
troller
Previous work only studied the effects of the attack,
but did not propose new control mechanisms to mit-
igate possible attacks. We know discuss how we can
start designing attack-resilient controllers.
In order to design an attack-resilient controller, we
can leverage the fact that the ISO has historical data
showing the behavior of the system which can be used
for learning the dynamics (parameters) of the system.
Whenever the controller commands do not have the
expected effect, or when the sensor signals to not
reflect the normal evolution of the system we can try
to identify these problems and design a controller that
minimizes the impact of price or sensor attacks.
As the attack are unknown inputs into the system, we
can use a type of disturbance estimators. Disturbance
observers have been studied in literature but we focus
our attention in the one introduced by Kim et al. [18]
for discrete-time systems.
We assume that the ISO possesses the information
about the supply-demand error Ek−1 and we try to
detect an attack using the observer (an observer is
another name for a “state estimator”).
We first present the attack-resilient controller for a
general discrete-time system, and in the next section
we show how to apply it to our real-time pricing model.
Let us consider a generic linear discrete-time system
for a sampling period T > 0 of the form
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + Γdk
yk = Cxk (11)
where xk ∈ Rn, uk ∈ Rm, dk ∈ Rq , and yk ∈ Rl are
the state variable, the control input, the disturbance,
and the measurement output, respectively. The
matrices A,B,Γ, C are of adequate dimension.
For dk = (d1k, . . . d
q
k), the disturbance is slowly
time-varying, such that dik+1 − dik < Tµi, ∀i =
1, . . . , q. Given a K ∈ Rq×n and C = In, the observer
is described as follows
zk+1 = zk +K
(
(A− In)xk +Buk + Γdˆk
)
dˆk = Kxk − zk (12)
Under the assumption that Γ is invertible, we can
choose K = (Iq −Φ)Γ−1 for Φ = [φ1, . . . , φq]>, and
φi ∈ (−1, 1). The estimation error is then bounded by
e∞ =
Tµi
1− |φi|
for φ ∈ (0, 1), and µi > 0.
However, as the ISO possesses only past information
about the state (i.e., xk−1 = Ek−1) the estimator
has to be slightly modified in order to estimate the
disturbance using only xk−1. As a consequence, the
estimation is always a delayed version of the real
disturbance. Therefore, the modified estimator is given
by
dˆk = Kxk−1 − zk−1
zk+1 = zk−1 +K
(
(A− In)xk−1 +Buk + Γdˆk
)
(13)
7.1. Estimation of Price Attacks
Let Gp = s˙(λ0) − w˙(λ0) and dk = dak to simplify
notation. We can write the feedback real-time pricing
problem using a discrete-time state space representa-
tion as follows
Ek+1 = Gpuk − ρw˙(λ0)dk
yk = Ek (14)
Note that comparing Equation (14) with Equation (11),
we have A = 0, B = Gp, Γ = −ρw˙(λ0), xk = Ek
and uk = λk.
Note that to compute the state estimation, it is
necessary to know Γ, which means that we would need
prior knowledge about the amount of compromised
nodes. Obviously, this requirement seems unrealistic as
ρ will remain unknown to the defender; however, we
can exploit a very interesting property of the estimator
we found to perform state estimation without knowing
ρ, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 7.1: Let us consider the disturbance
estimator described in (13) for the real-time pricing
model in Equation (14). The rate of change of the
disturbance ∆k = dk − dk−1 is bounded such that
∆dk ≤ Tµ for some constant µ and T the sampling
period. We define Γˆ as an approximate value of
Γ and eˆk = Γdk − Γˆdˆk as an error between the
real effect of the disturbance and its estimate. If
K = Γˆ−1(1−φ) for φ ∈ (−1, 1), the error converges
and is bounded by
|eˆ∞| ≤ 2|Γ|Tµ
1− |φ|
Proof:
The error evolution is
eˆk+1 = Γdk+1 − Γˆdˆk+1
= Γdk+1 − Γˆ(Kxk − zk)
= Γdk+1 − ΓˆK(Gpuk−1 + Γdk−1)
+ Γˆ(zk−2 −Kxk−2 + KΓpuk−1 + KΓˆdˆk−1)
= Γdk+1 − ΓˆKΓdk−1 − Γˆdk−1 + ΓˆKΓˆdˆk−1
= Γdk+1 − Γdk−1 − ΓˆK(Γdk−1 − Γˆdˆk−1)− Γˆdk−1 + Γdk−1
= 2Γ∆dk+1 + (1− ΓˆK)eˆk−1
As K = (1− φ)/Γˆ, in the equilibrium when eˆk+1 =
eˆk−1, eˆ∞ is bounded by
|eˆ∞| = 2Γ∆dk+1
1− |φ| ≤
2ΓTµ
1− |φ|

Remark 7.1: If the portion of compromised nodes
is identified, then the estimation error ek = dk − dˆk
converges and is bounded by
e∞ ≤ 2Tµ
1− |φ|
7.2. Estimation of Sensor Attacks
Similar to the previous case, estimating the distur-
bance na does not require prior knowledge of ρ due
to the fact that the attack modifies the information
that consumers provide about its consumption and this
affects directly the demand.
The state estimation can then be given by
zk+1 = zk−1 +K (−Ek−1 +Gpλk + Γnˆak)
nˆak = KEk−1 − zk−1 (15)
where Γ = −1. As it was proven before, eˆk is bounded
independent of Γˆ. This fact will be useful to detect
attacks without knowing its exact location, i.e., without
knowing if the attack is modifying the price or the
sensor information, and we can do this using the
same estimator (of course if the attacker controls both:
all price signals, and all sensor signals then there is
nothing we can do as we have lost any hope of getting
situational awareness from the system).
Before introducing the proposed detection mech-
anism, we will show how to improve disturbance
rejection of the system using the estimator.
7.3. Robust Control Algorithm
It is possible to modify the disturbance rejection
using an add-on compensator in the controller of the
form
uk = unom −B−1Γdˆk = λk −Gp−1Γˆdˆk
where unom is the controller under normal conditions.
The mismatch between the supply and the demand
is described by
Ek+1 = Gpλk + Γdk − Γˆdˆk
.
Clearly, if eˆk is small, disturbances are attenuated.
Including the robust controller in the system pro-
duces an improvement in the estimation, leading to
the following result.
Proposition 7.2: For the RTP system under ad-
ditive attack, and the proposed robust controller
λˆk = λk−G−1p Γˆdˆk, where dˆk is estimated according
to (13), the estimation error is bounded by
|eˆ∞| ≤ |Γ|Tµ
1− |φ|
Proof:
The proof is similar to Proposition 7.1, but because
λˆk = λk − Gˆk is the input, it leads to
eˆk+1 = Γdk+1 − ΓˆKeˆk − Γˆdˆk
= Γ∆dk+1 + φˆek
As K = (1−φ)/Γˆ, in the equilibrium when eˆk+1 =
eˆk−1, eˆ∞ is bounded by
|eˆ∞| = Γ∆dk+1
1− |φ| ≤
ΓTµ
1− |φ|
which satisfies the proof. 
According to Proposition 7.2, the z transform of the
error eˆk is
eˆ(z) =
G(z − 1)
z − φ d(z)
and the new sensitivity function S˜,d(z) can be ob-
tained as follows
E(z) = − 2ηE(z)
(1− z−1)z + eˆ(z)
Dividing by d(z) and factorizing we obtain
E(z)
d(z)
= Sˆ,d =
G(z − 1)2
(z − φ)(z − 1 + 2η) (16)
.
Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the maximum supply-
demand mismatch with the robust controller and the
nominal controller for an attack of the form sin(ωkT ).
Note that for frequencies below 1.9, the attack attenu-
ation is better than without the add-on compensator;
however, for high frequencies, the inclusion of the
compensator increases the impact of the attack.
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with the nominal controller and with the robust
controller. We can see that our robust controller
design can attenuate the errors caused by the
attack; however, at high frequencies it increases
the errors. In a later section we propose the use of
low-pass filters to prevent an attacker from using
high-frequency attacks.
We can obtain the frequency at which the robust
controller stops improving the system response under
attacks. To do this, we need to find ωc = ω :
|S,d(jωT )| = |Sˆ,d(jωT )|. Taking Equation (6) and
(16), we have that
|z − 1| = |z − φ|
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Figure 12. Supply-demand mismatch for an attack
of dk = sin(pi/4kT ). We can see that our new
robust controller attenuates the supply-demand
mismatch better than the nominal controller.
Replacing z = ejωT and solving for wc, we obtain
ωc =
1
T
arccos
(
φ2 − 1
2(φ− 1)
)
This relationship is shown in Figure 13. Note that
this frequency depends on φ. ωc is larger when φ
approaches −1. However, the pole corresponding to
z − φ would approach the unit circle, compromising
the exponential stability of the system.
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Figure 13. Cut-off frequency (for the usefulness of
the robust controller) depends on φ.
7.4. Improving Robustness: Digital Low-Pass
Filters in the Smart Meters
According to Figure 13, the maximum frequency
where our proposed robust controller can improve the
performance and attenuate the supply-demand error
under our attacks is ωc = pi/(2T ). The maximum
frequency at which an attacker can generate an
additive attack is ωmax = pi/T . So, there is a range of
frequencies that are amplified by the robust controller.
To mitigate this issue we propose the use of a digital
low-pass filter in the smart meters, in order to filter
price information with high frequency components.
The same filter has to be implemented by the third
party that calculates the price. The cut-off frequency
is given by ωc. Therefore, for our robust controller to
work, we conclude that every frequency greater than
ωc should be attenuated by the low-pass filter.
We now compare the performance and robustness
of the real-time pricing model including a digital IIR
low pass filter (Figure 14). The mathematical analysis
for designing the filter is omitted because this topic is
out of the scope of this manuscript. The reader only
needs to know that there are filters that can eliminate
high-frequency components of any signal.
Admittedly we could also have proposed deploying
low-pass filters at the beginning of the paper (before
the design of the robust controller), and we could also
have seen a significant improvement in minimizing the
maximum error that an attacker can create. However,
as Figure 11 shows, the performance of the robust
controller for low-frequency signals is still better than
the performance of the controller proposed in previous
work; therefore with the combination of low-pass
filters and robust controllers we seem to have obtained
an ideal combination of protection mechanisms.
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Figure 14. Supply-demand mismatch for dk =
sin(2pikT ) using the nominal controller, the robust
controller, and the robust+filter control.
In summary, the combination of a low-pass filter
deployed at all smart meters (or all devices receiving
price signals) in addition to a robust controller seems
to be the best solution to attenuate any type of attack
against our system. We believe this is one of the
few instances where a proposed attack-resilient control
algorithm does not pose significant negative perfor-
mance impacts on the system (when the system is not
under attack), but we plan to continue evaluating our
algorithm in other realistic real-time pricing settings to
identify any limitations.
8. Detection mechanism
We have designed a new real time pricing algorithm
that not only assures stability, but also minimizes the
impact of attacks. However, in practice, while we have
attenuated the attack, it would still be desirable to
know if we are under attack or not, so we can remove
compromised devices from our system.
The ISO calculates a clearing price each time period,
but even in the presence of an attack, the price changes
are small (see Figures 6 and 7). However, the state
estimator used in our robust controller can give infor-
mation about the presence of an attacker, by analyzing
the statistical behavior of the state estimator over long
periods of time.
The detection mechanism that we propose is based
on the accumulation of the rate of change of the esti-
mated signal dˆk. This is known as the non-parametric
CUSUM change detection statistic, and it is defined
as:
S0 = 0
Sk+1 = (Sk + |Gˆdˆk − Gˆdˆk−1| − αk)+ (17)
where Sk is the accumulated impact of the disturbance,
and αk is the rate of change of Sk under normal condi-
tions (without attacks). The use of the the error Γˆdˆk is
due to the fact that the ISO does not have knowledge
about Γ. An attack is detected when Sk > δ. δ has
to be selected such that the number of false alarms is
low. As it is based on the rate of change, then high
frequency attacks are detected faster.
8.1. Simulations: Detecting attacks
We assume a populated area with 1 million house-
holds, each one receiving information about the price
every 30 minutes. To improve the realism of the
simulations, we assume that the parameters D and bk
change each time period according to a half-hourly
baseline demand profile provided by AEMO from July
21st to 27th, in NSW, Australia. The baseline load
per house is a scaled version of the real whole NSW
region. The parameters of the linear CEO model are
p = 31 and q = 917 during the simulation time.
We assume that an attack is launched and modifies
the price information of 50% of the households. The
attack is of amplitude 0.1 $ /MWh, and a frequency
ω.
The estimation is based on prior information of
the baseline load. However, we assume an error in
the real-time baseline consumption, such that the ISO
calculates the estimation and the robust control based
on an approximate load profile, and not the real time
consumption. Despite that limitation, the detection
algorithm is able to detect an attack when a threshold
is achieved.
Figure 15 illustrates the time that it takes to detect
an attack depending on the frequency of the attack
for a threshold δ = 10, which is selected with results
without attack in order to avoid false alarms. Note that
for high frequency, the time of detection is low, which
is an advantage in order to start a scan in the smart
meters and find the victims of the attack.
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Figure 15. Detection for different frequency values
of the attack.
We can also observe that the detection time does not
depend on the η.
Our work on detection is preliminary, and in future
work we plan to identify the tradeoffs the attacker will
face when deciding to launch attacks that maximize the
error between power generated and consumed while
also maintaining the attack undetected.
9. Conclusions
In this work we used the theory from sensitivity
analysis to understand how previously proposed attacks
could be generalized and evaluated in a formal setting.
In particular we showed how to find better attacks than
previously proposed, and how to design robust control
systems that can mitigate a large number of attacks.
We also found that the design of the price adjustment
mechanism is fundamental in the resiliency of the
system. In particular, low values of η reduce the effect
of the attacks on both the prices and sensors.
Another of our contributions was the model to
sensor attacks, and how they can have potentially more
damaging effects than attacks on the pricing signal.
We also proposed an attack-resilient controller and
several mitigation mechanisms, such as the use of
low-pass filters to prevent high-frequency signals, and
attack detection mechanisms. We believe we are one
of the few research papers focusing on the important
aspect of designing robust control algorithms against
false data injection, as much of the previous work tends
to focus on state estimation but does not consider the
control actions of the system under attack, and how to
design an controller that mitigates these attacks.
Our results show principled ways to use control
theory in the design of attack-resilient cyber-physical
systems. In general we believe that a well-designed
defense-in-depth mechanism for cyber-physical sys-
tems will have to leverage not only information se-
curity expertise, but control theory to detect, respond,
and reconfigure systems that can survive partial com-
promises.
Successfully compromising computers and embed-
ded systems participating in controlling the power grid
is only the first step to a successful attack. To have
a predictable physical modification to the power grid
(e.g., strategically manipulating voltages, or loads),
the attacker needs to understand how control systems
operate.
Defenders that leverage only information security
mechanisms in their protection strategy will have lim-
ited success against these sophisticated attackers. To
develop a defense-in-depth security strategy, defenders
need to incorporate control models of the power grid
to understand the vulnerabilities and fragility of the
system they are trying to protect (e.g., not all compro-
mised devices can drive a system to an unsafe state),
and to design attack-resilient control algorithms that
can survive a partial compromise of the system. Our
work shows a direction of how to pursue this goal
further and in general we hope these formalisms can
help mitigate attacks not only against the power-grid
but against other cyber-physical systems.
One interesting area of future research that we
did not address in this paper are the possible attack
strategies that can be achieved by combining attacks
to both: sensors and control signals. All our models
assumed the attacker compromised either the price
signals, or the sensor signals, but not both. It is clear
that if the attacker controls all control signals and all
sensor signals then there is nothing we can do, but if
the attacker has partial compromise of controllers and
sensors, then the defender might still be able to design
a robust algorithm that attenuates the attacks. We plan
to look into this area in future work.
References
[1] R. Tan, V. Badrinath Krishna, D. K. Yau, and Z. Kalbar-
czyk, “Impact of integrity attacks on real-time pricing
in smart grids,” in Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications
security. ACM, 2013, pp. 439–450.
[2] Y. Liu, M. K. Reiter, and P. Ning, “False data injection
attacks against state estimation in electric power grids,”
in CCS ’09: Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 21–32.
[3] D. Mashima and A. A. Ca´rdenas, “Evaluating electric-
ity theft detectors in smart grid networks,” in Research
in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses (RAID). Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 210–229.
[4] G. Da´n and H. Sandberg, “Stealth Attacks and Protec-
tion Schemes for State Estimators in Power Systems,”
in First IEEE Smart Grid Commnunications Conference
(SmartGridComm), October 2010.
[5] O. Kosut, L. Jia, R. Thomas, and L. Tong, “Malicious
Data Attacks on Smart Grid State Estimation: Attack
Strategies and Countermeasures,” in First IEEE Smart
Grid Commnunications Conference (SmartGridComm),
October 2010.
[6] L. Phillips, M. Baca, J. Hills, J. Margulies, B. Tejani,
B. Richardson, and L. Weiland, “Analysis of operations
and cyber security policies for a system of cooperating
flexible alternating current transmission system,” Dec.
2005.
[7] S. Sridhar and G. Manimaran, “Data integrity attack
and its impacts on voltage control loop in power grid,”
in Prc. IEEE Power Energy Soc. General Meeting, Jul.
2011.
[8] P. Mohajerin Esfahani, M. Vrakopoulou, K. Margellos,
J. Lygeros, and G. Andersson, “Cyber attack in a two-
area power system: Impact identification using reacha-
bility,” in American Control Conference (ACC), 2010,
30 2010-july 2 2010, pp. 962 –967.
[9] P. Esfahani, M. Vrakopoulou, K. Margellos, J. Lygeros,
and G. Andersson, “A robust policy for automatic
generation control cyber attack in two area power
network,” in Decision and Control (CDC), 2010 49th
IEEE Conference on, dec. 2010, pp. 5973 –5978.
[10] S. Sridhar and G. Manimaran, “Data integrity attacks
and their impacts on SCADA control system,” in Prc.
IEEE Power Energy Soc. General Meeting, Jul. 2010.
[11] M. Negrete-Pincetic, F. Yoshida, and G. Gross, “To-
wards quantifying the impacts of cyber attacks in the
competitive electricity market environment,” in 2009
IEEE PowerTech, June 2009.
[12] L. Xie, Y. Mo, and B. Sinopoli, “False Data Injection
Attacks in Electricity Markets,” in First IEEE Smart
Grid Commnunications Conference (SmartGridComm),
October 2010.
[13] J. Liyan, R. J. Thomas, and L. Tong, “Impacts of
malicious data on real-time price of electricity market
operations,” in 45th Hawaii International Conference
on System Sciences, January 2012, pp. pp.1907–1914.
[14] NYISO, “NYISO markets and operations–market
data–load data,” http://www.nyiso.com/public/markets
operations/market data/load data/index.jsp, 2014, [On-
line; accessed 1-August-2014].
[15] M. Roozbehani, M. Rinehart, M. Dahleh, S. Mitter,
D. Obradovic, and H. Mangesius, “Analysis of com-
petitive electricity markets under a new model of real-
time retail pricing,” in Energy Market (EEM), 2011 8th
International Conference on the European, may 2011,
pp. 250–255.
[16] A. Teixeira, G. Dan, H. Sandberg, R. Berthier,
R. Bobba, and A. Valdes, “Security of smart distribu-
tion grids: Data integrity attacks on integrated volt/var
control and countermeasures,” in Proceedings of the
American Control Conference (ACC), 2014.
[17] J. C. Doyle, B. A. Francis, and A. R. Tannenbaum,
Feedback control theory. Courier Dover Publications,
2013.
[18] K.-S. Kim and K.-H. Rew, “Reduced order disturbance
observer for discrete-time linear systems,” Automatica,
vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 968 – 975, 2013.
